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THE NEW PROPERTY 
Those of us who are in the federal service often times 
~ake great pride in being associated with t~e protector of 
the people, the government. Government is known for its ability 
to instantaneously react to a problem and create, over night, 
new mechanisms to deal with a perceived wrong. I could give 
you many examples of this characteristic of government; however, 
I think that I need give you only a few. 
Starting with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
an organization on which I am proud to be a member, it was 
established in 1965 to deal with a nationally recognized pro-
blem of discrimination in employment based on"race, color, sex, 
religion and national origin. In passing Title VII, Congress 
.......... 
limited the right of an employer to adversely affect one's job 
by using the forbidden factors of race, color, sex, religion 
or national origin. Stated in other words, Congress created a 
right in the individual not to have his or her job adversely 
affected by those forbidden factors. 
This same pattern can also be seen in other areas where 
laws have forbidden employers from adversely affecting the 
employment of individuals based on proscribed factors. For 
example, the Age Discrimination in Emplo¥ment Act forbids an 
"-. 
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employer from discriminating against an individual because he 
or she is between the ages of forty and seventy. The Equal 
Pay Act prohibits an employer from paying women a lower wage 
than men for ferfOrming substantially the same work. The 
Rehabilitation Act prohibits certain employers from discrimi-
nating against individuals because of handicapp. The National 
Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an individual for engaging in certain protected union 
activity. The Occupational Safety and Health Act prohibits an 
employer from retaliating against an individual for complaining 
about unsafe work situations. 
All of these examples, and of course many more, are 
situations where laws have limited the unfettered right of 
employers to do whatever they please. Or stated otherwise, 
those laws created rights in employees and potential employees 
to be free from having their employment adversely affected by 
those limited, forbidden factors. 
In assuring these statutorily-created rights, Congres-s 
created administrative agencies to, in many instances, determine 
on a case-by-case basis whether or not an individual's rights 
were violated and, upon finding a violation, ordering corrective 
action. Moreover, since the rights created by these statutes 
are generally limited, the agencies charged with enforcing 
these rights very often have very limited jurisdiction as a con-
sequence. Therefore, often times the same action may violate 
, . 
Philad'elphia Chapter FBA - 3 
more than one of these limited rights. But because the agencies 
created have limited authority, often times more than one 
investigation may be conducted because' the same action may vio-
late different statutes. On the one'hand, one could call this 
! 
multiplicitous action duplication. Yet, on the other hand it 
could be called a natural flaw that flows from a piece-meal 
approach to a larger problem. 
Although most legislation created to deal with employment 
problems fit the mold which I just described, there are other 
approaches which blankedly prohibit adverse employment decisions 
from being made for other than for good cause. Two examples 
of this approach that readily 'come to mind are union agreements 
and civil service laws. These two, rather than creating many 
individual prohibitions like the legislative approach that I 
mentioned a short time ago, generally deal with the same types 
of concerns in a broader fashion. 
The legislative approach can with one stroke of the pen 
change the contours of the universe overnight. The collective 
bargaining approach can gradually create rights for its members, 
depending on the relative strength of the union vs. management at 
any given time. 
The judiciary, although slowly, 'often times reacts to 
these same changing realities" but in a different manner~ Unlike, 
the legislative 'branch's ability:to sweepingly change the status 
quo overnight, the judiciary often· times 'creates on~'~,exception' < : . .:.. 
to a general rule at a time. However, this slow process over a "':-, 
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period of time can convert what was an exception to the general 
rule into the general rule. 
With this in mind, I would like to now trace the approach 
that the judiciary has taken to the right to the job. At the 
c 
common_law, the relationship between employer and "employee was 
treated as one of the master and servant. Master-servant rela-
tions law very early adopted the characteristics of contract law. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the great majority of 
American courts by the end of the 19th, century adopted the 
rule that an employment with no fixed duration was presumptively 
an employment at will, terminable for any or no reason by either 
party at any time. This doctrine, known as Woods law, although 
first asserted without analysis or judicial support, was con-
sistent with prevailing lassez-faire notions. 
While the rule of free terminability of ~he employment 
relationship was becoming generally accepted, no rule seemed more 
certain than a rule of domestic-relations law which held that a 
marriage was terminable only for serious cause. The contrast" '. 
between the rule regarding the termination of a.marriage'and the 
one concerning termination of employment becomes more startling 
upon reflecting on the fact that both relationships were governed 
by the same domestic retations rules at one point. 
Amazingly, the rules regarding termination of employment 
and termination of a marriage have crisscross again. Marriage 
is now' terminable by either spouse at will in t~e majority of ' 
states, whil~most employees in the labor force can be discharged 
only for cause. 
, '. 
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The erosion of the rule that employment is terminable by 
either party for any or no reason at any time can be seen in 
several cases during the last several decades. 
A. Public Policy Exception 
one of the first exceptions to the free terminability rule 
was articulated in the case of Petermann v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App 2d 184, 344 p. 2d 25 (1959). In 
Petermann, a former business agent of the Teamsters Union brought 
a wrongful discharge suit against his employer-union, alleging 
that he had been fired because of his refusal to commit perjury 
at this employer's request. The California- Court of Appeal held 
that Petermann had stated a claim for relief and that considera-
tions of public policy might limit the employer's right to dis-
charge an employee. This exception of the free terminability 
rule_ is referred to as the public policy exception. 
B. Abandoning the General Rule 
Wpi1e some courts have attempted to soften the harshness 
of the rule of free terminability by creating limited exceptions -- I-
to the general rule, others have attempted to _rewrite the -rule - ;-:~--
itself. In-Monge v. Beeke Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 
(1974), ~he plaintiff claimed that her discharge had resulted-
from her:;:' foreman , s hostility towards her because she refused to 
--
go out with him. She sued for damages for breach-of her oral 
contract of emp1oyment.- The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled , . : ..•. 
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"employer has long ruled the workplace with an "iron hand" by 
reason of Woods rule, and that "courts cannot ignore the new 
climate prevai~ing generally in the relationship of employer and 
c 
employee". ':he court stated a new standard to govern discharge 
cases: 
"We hold that a termination by the employer 
of a contract of employment at will which is 
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on 
retaliation is not in the best interest of 
the economic system or the public good and 
constitutes a breach of the employment con-
tract ••• Such a rule affords the employee 
a certain stability of employment and does 
not interfere with the employer's normal 
exercise of his right to discharge, which is 
necessary to permit him to operate his 
business efficiently and profitably. II 
The court'in Monge, unlike' Wood's rule, balanced the 
interest of the employer against the interest of the employee 
to arrive at the public interest. Stated the court: 
"In all employment contracts, whether at 
will or for a definite term, the employer's 
interest in ~unning his business as he sees 
fit must be balanced against the interest 
'of the employee in maintaining his employ-
ment, and the public's interest in maintain-
ing a proper balance' between the two." 
Another court to reformulate Wood's rule was the Massacuhsetts 
Judicial' Court in Fortune v. National Cash, Register, 364 N. E •. 2d 
1251 (1977). In Fortune, a sixty-one year old salesman was ter~ 
~inated shortly after he cO!'lpleted arrangements .for a 5 million.. 
dollar sale of cash'registers. He brought an action for unpaid" 
, ".' 
sales commissions. Al though "the company had paid Fortune the 
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portio~ of the commission due under the literal terms of his 
contract, Fortune alleged that his empioyer terminated his 
employment to avoid paying him additional amounts that would 
have become d~e under·the contract. The jury found that the 
! 
company had acted in bad faith in terminating the employment. 
The issue on appeal was whether the at-will contract was breached 
by this bad faith termination. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that under traditional 
law and under the express terms of the contract, the company 
clearly could have terminated Fortune wit~out cause, and that 
he had received all the commissions to which the contract 
entitled him •. Nevertheless, the court agreed with Fortune that, 
despite the express terms of the contract, he was entitled to 
a jury determination as to the company's motives in terminating 
his employment. The court held that Fortune's contract con-
tract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a -. 
breach of the contract. "': •. >'}> 
, ~. , ~~.~.~.' , 
The court found authority for its decision in the uniform' 
commercial code, stating: 
"[W]e are merely recognizing the general 
requirement in this commonwealth that parties 
.to contracts and commercial transactions ' 
~'must act in good faith towards one another. 
Good faith and fair'dealing between parties 
are pervasive requirements in our law; it 
can be said fairly, that parties to con- . 
tracts or commercial transactions are bound· 
by this standard. II " •. : .. ". ,:'~'", '"J~"" 0" ," • 
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TBis analysis shows how the various branches of government 
react to unfairness. No one would argue that Woods law was fair. 
The fallacy of:~ its inception was that it assumed equal bargaining 
j 
strength betw~en employer and employee. Based on that faulty 
assumption, it assumed that if the parties wanted the employment 
to last for a longer period of time, they would have indicated 
that in the contract of employment. 
The underlying' fallacy' of this argument was probably high-
lighted by the provision in .collective bargaining agreements' 
forbidding termination for other than good cause. Moreover, 
such agreements showed the harshness of Woods rule. 
Even' ~hough the harshness' of Woods law is quite evident, 
it is amazing how the market place through collective bargaining, 
the' legislative branch of government, and. the judiciary' all 
reacted differently to Woods rule. 
The legislative' branch, as pressure groups gained political 
power, responded to the'individual groups by tryi~g' to cure. 
their individual'problems'~ The judiciary, while circumscribed 
by prec.edent, used the old concept that you must come to the 
court'with clean hands. And the market place' reacted to its 
new muscle by declaring that if it does not interfere with 'my 
work, you:~:"Should not be' able to"do,' it •. 
Although the collective'bargain-i~g and legislative approaches 
.may in the end bring about the same result, the collective bargain~ 
ing approach is less bureaucratic. 
.... _1:. 1 • 
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'/ 
Although the judiciary has responded to the problem in a 
les's sweeping way than the other two, the judiciary approach 
does'nt appeaf to be too far from declaring that one has a 
f 
property rigtit in the job. If the judicia~y so declares, it 
will only be reflecting what the legislative branch and collec-
tive bargaining are already saying more subtly. 
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